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CRoss-NATIONAL WOMEN'S
ECONOMIC EQUALITY IN

1993

JOSHUA LLOYD
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ojll'011leIJ:r IiIl11It111 r{!!.!JtJ arol/fld Ibe lI'Orfd.

cholarly literature on international women's
rights abounds with qualitative case studies and
international law research but neglects quantitative
supported studies for a number of reasons. First,
obtaining data across a large enough section of
states in order to give a substantially cross-national
base is difficult. Second, data-gathering bodies
often fail to collect and report specifically genderrelated measures. Finally, cross-national studies
are cross-cultural as well; culture is difficult to
quantify, greatly impeding past research.
Although cultural difference creates a sIgnificant barrier for quantitative research, recent
improvements in raw data allow us to better
anah-ze the factors that lead to women's human
rights violations.' Cross-national quantitative
studies have helped scholars identify and measure
these factors. To further the findings of these
scholars, I employ a similar model, compiling
,-arious hypotheses and testing them statistically.
I use this method to explore the relationship

S

between gender economIc equalit\· and such
variables as economic development, the level of
democracy, female literacy rate, women's political
participation, and reproductive rights. Conventional wisdom and hints from previous studies,
rather than any specific theoretical basis, lead me
to assume the importance of these factors. This
area of study is still in its infancy; examining the
effect of many variables will provide a basis for
theoretical understanding that can lead to more
focused, rigorous studies.
PREVJ( lCS STl'DIES

Several empirical studies, though not specifically addressing human rights issues, show which
difterent aspects of women's rights scholars have
examined. Clark (1991), Semyonov (1980), and
Semyonov and Shenhav (1988) look at labor
force participation by women across countries. The
United Nations (1992) has done research that deals
with the proportion of women in decision-making
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jobs. Sen (19R7) and Basu (1992) look more
generally at the CJualit\· of life of women. /\nd
finally, Nader (198(l) looks at cross-national
systems of male dominance over women.'
Clair Apodaca (1998) focuses more on \VOmen's human rights and creates the index on

The study- most closely related to mine is b\Poe, \X'endel-Blunt, and Ho (1997) in which thn'
formulate t\\'O cross-national measures for the year
1993: one deals with women's political equalit\" the
other \\'ith economic equality, The\' look at some

women's economic and social rights (\\,ESHR),
which measures differences between male and
female rights regarding work, the standard of living,
health and well-being, and education.; She uses this
index to look at how economic development affects
the realization of women's economic and social

le\'el of development and then correlate the scores
with GNP per capita, The\' find it to be significant,
though it is only a bivariate (t\vo-\'ariable) test.
While the\, intend to look at this relationship in
more detail in the future, the\, have made their
scores publicl\' a\'ailable. I plan to use their measure
of women's economic equality as the dependent
variable in nw study, responding to their "hope that
ltheir scoresJ will be helpful to others who wish to
do research in this area,"'"

rights by region. She finds that economic de\'elopment leads to greater realization of these rights and
that as development increases, women's share of
the prosperity also increases.' S. Laurel \,{'eldon
(1999) examines cross-national government responsiveness to violence against women, concluding that strong autonomous women's movements
and their links to an effective women's policy
bureaucracy or other government insider most
determine if and how a government deals with
battered women issues.'
Finally, four other studies are closely related to
my research. The first is a simple analysis of some
factors that hypothetically might affect human
rights conditions in states, such as the type
of regime, the type of colonial past, level of
development, and the level of trade with capitalist
states." Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate and
~eith (1999) do two much more rigorous studies,
building on Mitchell and ~lcCormick, in which
they examine a number of factors that they
hypothesize ma\' affect human rights dealing with
violation of personal integrity: level of democracy,
population size, rate of population change, economic standing, rate of economic growth, presence of a leftist government, military control,
British cultural intluence, international war, and
civil war.- The difference between their two studies
is the number of years and 'the countries that they
examine. The\' find that civil war is the strongest
factor that contributes to violations of personal
integrity. Interestingly, this change alters some of
the conclusions about the causes of personal
integrity abuse.' Economic development, democracy, population size, economic standing, and
international war were also substantially significant
factors.
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descriptive properties of the scores by region and

i\1( lDEL ( l!' CR( lSS-;\j ,\TI< )1'\:,\1. \X'( ),\1 Fl'-:'s Eo )'-;( )"!IC
RI(dITS

To contribute to the continuing ettort to
illuminate causes of the denial of human rights
to women in various countries, I build a crosssectional multivariate linear model that regresses
the level of women's economic equality in 1993 on
several uther variables. The model is essentialh
built following the process used b,' Poe, Tate, and
I,eith," which is based on Blalock's Theory
Construction (1969)," In this system, the research
compiles various h\'potheses, then inserts them
into a theory-driven model that is estimated
mathematically,
Various international documents define
women's economic rights, the dependent variable
in m\, stud\,. The Uni\'ersaI Declaration on Human
Rights is generally accepted as the ultimate human
rights standard against which countries should be
judged. It declares in Article 23, section 1, that
"everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment" and in section 2, that "everyone,
without am discrimination, has the right to equal
pay for equal worL"" In addition, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
mandates that women's "conditions of work are
not inferior to those enjoyed by men" and that
women are entitled to eCJual pay for equal work,"
Using these declarations as a guide, Poe, \VendelBlunt, and Ho code State Department reports for
the year 1993 for 174 countries, The scale ranges
from 1 to 4, with 1 representing the lowest level of

Table 1. Scale I 'sed to Produce \X'omen's I':conomic Rights Countn Scores (Poe Score)
S( (au

\'CII\T TilE

S( '( lRI·.

II\:DIC\TES

1

No la\\'S exist that guarantee eLJual rights In the workplace or equal pal' for equal work Sexual economIC
discrimination is practiced and acccpted lw most of the population.

2

Laws apparentl\' prohibit sexual discrimination and guarantee eClual pay for equal work Sexual discrimination
is practiced lw most and there are no serious governmental efforts to improvc the situation,

i

Laws prohibit sexual discrimination and guarantee eLJual pal' for eLJual \\'C)rk Some sexual economIc
discrimination is practiced but no longer accepted b\' most of the population, Serious government efforts arc
undcr wa\' to fight discrimination and ensure equal par

-l

Laws prohibit scxual discrimination and guarantee eLJual pm' for equal work Discrimination IS no longer
acccpted I1\' most of the population and is therefore no longer a serious social problem,

economic equalit\, and 4 representing the highest.
To summarize the criteria for coding countries,
refer to Table 1,
The Poe score is designed as an indicator of
actual social and governmental attitudes towards
women's economic rights, This is probably one of
the best ways to measure such rights since women's
equality is most closely linked to preYailing societal
attitudes. Therefore, the researcher can use virtually am "facts on the ground" as independent
variables without these being included in the
score for the dependent variable, unless they deal
specifically with laws and practices of economic
discrimination. I t is important to note that this is
an ordinal scale with discrete values. There really
exists no in-between score such as two or three. \'V'e
\\,ill assume, however, for the purposes of this
study that this is interval-level data that runs
continuously between 1 and 4.
J\l\' first independent variable is level of economic development, measured h· gross national
product (GNP) per capita for each country in
1991. 1 • Poe, Tate and Keith; Poe, Wendel-Blunt
and Ho; and Apodaca all find economic development to be an important factor in human rights
in general and women's rights in particular. I include it because it is necessary to control for this
variable and substantiate or refute these previous
studies. I h\lx,thesize that economic development
will increase the women's economic equality
score.
Past studies validate this hypothesized
relationship. Economic development, scholars
reason, liberates women from the rural lifestyle in

which husbands and fathers often dominate
them. I" The dissemination of information through
technology exposes women to arguments for
economic equality, which then leads them to
change the status quo. This reasoning, however,
goes against some conventional wisdom that
economic development is detrimental to human
rights. for this reason, we need to distinguish
between level and rate of development. Scholars
have shown that it is the rate of growth that often
leads to more oppression while a higher level of
development contributes to recognition of human
rights. 1The second independent variable is the level of
democracy. In more democratic nations (ones that
give the vote to women, for example) women have
more opportunit\· to express dissatisfaction with
their economic condition and to work for change
that will improve their position. The measure for
democracy will be a composite of the Freedom
House (Gas til) civil and political freedom scores
for the \'ear 1993-94. 1' This composite score is
following the example of Burkhart and LewisBeck, who use it to cover the full range of variance
in democracy-both civil and political. I" For other
usage of the Gastil measure, see Poe and Tate. 211
I hypothesize that as the level of democracy
increases, economic rights will also increase. 1 have
not reversed the scale as Burkhart did, though, so
we would expect that as the Freedom House score
decreases, the Poe score will increase.
The next independent variable has to do with
reproductive rights. 1\ prevalent argument deals
with the question of whether reproductive rights
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Table 2. Variable Operationalizations
I/ariable

Operaliollalizalioll

Women's Economic

Four-point oretinal measure of economic equality in 1-993 provided by Poe, Wendel-Blunt, and Ho

Equality

(1 = least economic equality; 4 = most economic equality)

Economic De,·elopment

GNP per capita in 1991

Level of Democrac),

Freedom House composite democracy score in 1993 (2 = mOst democracy; 14 = least democracy)

Reproductive Rights

Percentage of married women of reproductive age who are using modern contraception in 1990

Women's Political Participation
Female Literacy Rate

Percentage of seats held bl' women

are a necessary prerequisite to women's economic
rights.2I I contend that they are. As women gain
substantive reproductive rights, they are then able
to control how many children they have and when
they have them. This allows them to attend school
more readily and continuously, leading to informed
attitudes about rights among women and more
mobility in the domestic women's movement. To
measure this variable, I use the percentage of
married women who are using modern contraception (as opposed to traditional contraceptive
methods) in 1990. 22 This is a proxy variable: higher
level of use of modern contraceptives may not
necessarily indicate a higher level of reproductive
rights. It is therefore not an ideal measure, but
scholars have used it in the past. 23 A higher level of
reproductive rights (modern contraceptive use) will
lead to an increase in the economic equality scale.
Women's political participation will also lead to
increases in economic rights. As the proportion of
women in government increases, the discourse
about women's rights in government will increase
and voting power for women's rights advocates in
legislative bodies will increase. I measure political
participation as the percentage of women in
representative governmental positions in a given
country in 1992. 24 As women's political participation increases, the women's economic equality score
will increase.
Finally, female literacy rate also plays a role
in women's economic rights. As women become
more literate, they are better able to tap into
resources that educate them about their rights.
Education leads to activism and mass mobilization,
which leads to change in economic and political
rights. Where there are great amounts of literacy,
women will be more informed about their options
and, therefore, will act to procure them. The
measure for this variable is the female adult literacy

30 ·

SIGMA

in~arljament

in 1992

Percentage of adult female litetacy in 1994

rate for each country in 1994. 25 We expect, therefore, that as female adult literacy increases, the
women's economic equality score will also increase.
The linear multivariate model for 1993 1n
equation form is as follows:
Women's Economic Equality;
~ 1 + ~2
Economic Development; + ~3 Level of
Democracy; + ~4 Reproductive Rights; + ~ 5
Women's Political Participation; + ~6 Female
Literacy Rate; + V;
~l
intercept
~11
regression coefficient of variable n
~;
error term for country i

=

=
=
=

D ESCR1JYfIVE ANALYSIS

Only two countries (Australia and Norway) out
of the 174 achieve a women's economic equality
score of 4 (sexual economic discrimination is no
longer a real problem) . Not surprisingly, both
countries have a high level of human development,
being ranked number three and number thirteen
respectively on the Human Development Index
(HDI) , a ranking sys tem that considers life
expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, combined
school enrollment ratio, and adjusted per capita
income. 26 Of the 174 countries, 30 received a score
of 3 (indicating a serious effort by the government
to undermine economic discrimination and that
Chart 1. Poe Scaes for 174 Comtries

120
100
80
~rrb.rof

Countries

Poe Score

JOSHUA LLOYD
most of the population is supportive of those
efforts); 22 of these 30 countries have what is
considered a high human development,27 5 have a
medium human development and 2 have a low
human development (I was not able to ascertain
the level of human development of one of the
countries). This may indicate that it is not always
necessary for a country to have a highly developed
economy in order for it to have a relatively high
level of economic equality for women. The
overwhelming majority of states (104) have Poe
scores of 2. These are states that appear to have
women's rights in their discourse (they have laws
against economic discrimination on the books),
but they are not yet enforcing those laws.
Additionally, most of the population does not
accept economic equality by gender. The mean
score for economic rights overall is 1.98 with a
standard deviation of 0.67. Chart 1 demonstrates
the distribution of countries by score.
In performing the regression analysis, it is
important to remember that this scale is very small
(in terms of units) and so a small numerical change
represents a large societal change.
D ATA ANALYSIS

As already mentioned, the Poe score is regressed linearly on the listed independent variables.
The model is linear because at this point there is no
theoretical reason to suppose that the relationships
are quadratic, cubic, or otherwise. In order to
perform the regression with the variables that the
model outlined above requires, I had to reduce
the number of cases considered. One of the
advantages to the Poe score is that it includes
a sweeping view of cross-national women's
economic equality. Unfortunately, because of data
limitations I was only able to find data on all of the
Table 3. Breakdown of Sample Countries by Region
Rt;giol/

NlIllIber of COllI/tries

Western Europe and

17

North Ameri ca
Latin America

14

Africa

30

Asia

20

Eastern Europe

10

Caribbean

4

Middle East

5

Chart 2. Poe Scores for 66 Comtries

35
~

25 '
Number of 20

Countries

15

Poe Score

variables for 100 countries. The reduction in the
number of cases is disappointing, for it limits
the conclusions that we can draw on a crossnational basis. Instead of drawing conclusions
based on all of the countries, I will be basing
mine on a smaller number.
The qualitative aspects of the countries in
question, in addition to the limit in the number of
cases, are also important. Fortunately the distribution of countries in different levels of development and region is similar to the full population.
Basing the divisions again on the HDI, there are
35 countries that rank high, 39 countries that rank
medium, and 26 countries that rank low. Regarding
region, there are 17 countries from Western Europe
and North America, 14 from Latin America, 30
from Africa, 20 from Asia, 10 from Eastern
Europe, 4 from the Caribbean, and 5 from the
Middle East (one of the hot spots when it comes to
women's rights issues) (see Table 3).
This sample includes 2 countries that score a 4;
23 countries with a score of 3; 59 countries with
a score of 2; and 16 with a score of 1. The distribution of the second, reduced sample is fairly
similar to that of all 174 countries. The sample
mean is 2.11 and the standard deviation is 0.68.
This is not the same as the full set of countries, but
it is fortunately not too far off and will have to
suffice. Chart 2 reflects this sample distribution.
The results of the corrected regression are
presented in Table 4, after correcting for
heteroscedasticity and recognizing the limitations
on the data. The female literacy rate and level of
women's reproductive rights did not exert a
statistically significant effect on the independent
variable. Nor did they exercise a jointly significant
effect, as demonstrated by an F-test. I took them
out of the model, therefore, and included the
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Table 4. Corrected i\lodcl Results

Constant

2.11

<.1101"

(.1 "."

1.2.11)

.11001121

<.illll'

(.111111;

2.3H

-.1152

.i II 1.)*

(.111")

-3.0\

Women's ]>o!Jtical Participation

.024

<.1I0l +

(.1111(,)

goes up, the level of democrac,' in the country
diminishes). This is the directi'on indicated b~'
the h,'pothesis·: as democracy increases, so doe's
women's economic equality.
The last significant variable is women's political
participation. The results confirm the prediction
of the hypothesis that political participation b,"
women increases the level of economic equality
between genders. As the number of women in
parliament increases by lU percent, the economic
equality score also goes up by 0.24 points.

.1.(1l

1(111
R 'quare

results of the refitted model in Table 4. The
variables that exercised a significant effect were
the level of economic development, the level of
democracy, and women's political participation.
The R-square at the bottom of the table indicates
that these three variables account for 59 percent of
the variation in women's economic equality.
The results here substantiate previous studies'
findings about the positive relationship between
economic development and women's rights. As the
GNP per capita increases by ten thousand dollars
the women's economic equ~lity score will increas~
by 0.21 points. Given that the scale is only a fourpoint scale, a fifth of a point is quite sul~stantial.
An increase of ten thousand dollars in GNP per
capita, though, is also a \'Crv substantial increase. In
the sample, the country with the highest GNP per
capita in 1991 is Switzerland with $33,610; the
country with the lowest is Morocco with $80. It
would take decades, however, for a country to
increase its GNP per capita by ten thou~and
dollars. If we take the average GNP per capita of
the countries ($4965) and assume a constant annual
growth rate of 13.5 percent, the highest growth
rate of any of the countries in the sample, it would
take fifteen years for GNP per capita to increase b,'
that amount. This indicates that grmvth is a slo\~'
process and that change in women's economic
equality is relatively slow as well.
The second significant variable in the model is
the level of democracy. As the Freedom House
composite score increases by five points, women's economic equality goes down bv 0.25 points
(remember that as the Freedom House score
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This stud," substantiates previous studies that
have concluded that the level of economic
development in a country positively affects women's economic equality. In addition, 1 found that
two new variables positively intluence women's
economic equality: the level of democrao' and
the le\'cl of women's political participatio~ also
exercise statisticalh" significant effects on the
independent variable, thus supporting my originalh"
hypothesized relationships. This evidence is of
Immense importance for women's groups and
polio'makers at all levels because it imhcates
possible ways (working for economic de\'elopment,
promoting democrao', and putting women in
government) to positiveh' intluence women's rights.
The factors that 1 found to be insignificant are
perhaps more important in other areas of women\;
rights, particularly political rights. I did not
examine that here because the Poe score, the most
comprehensive measure, focuses on economic
rights. It would be interesting to construct a ne\\"
model to measure political rights.
This study represents a new step in the
quantitative study of international women's rights,
but it is onl" a beginning, Additional data must be
obtained on more countries in order to make a
comprehensive model of comparative women's
human rights (across nations, over time, and over
more variables). As governments make progress in
women's human rights, they will find more variance
across nations, allowing for more precise pmpointing of what factors further those rights.
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